Global religious changes and civil life in two Chinese societies:  a comparison of Jiangsu and Taiwan by Weller, Robert P.
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
BU Open Access Articles BU Open Access Articles
2015-04-03
Global religious changes and civil
life in two Chinese societies: a
comparison of Jiangsu and Taiwan
This work was made openly accessible by BU Faculty. Please share how this access benefits you.
Your story matters.
Version Published version
Citation (published version): Robert P Weller. 2015. "Global Religious Changes And Civil Life In
Two Chinese Societies: A Comparison Of Jiangsu And Taiwan." Review
Of Faith & International Affairs, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp. 13 - 24.
https://hdl.handle.net/2144/21705
Boston University
	 1	
Global	Religious	Changes	and	Civil	Life	in	Two	Chinese	Societies:		A	Comparison	of	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	
 Robert	P.	Weller	Boston	University		[Paper	accepted	by	The	Review	of	Faith	&	International	Affairs,	January	2015]				 The	twentieth	century	brought	several	new	developments	that	affected	religious	life	around	the	world	and	that	continue	to	have	important	impacts	today.		In	particular,	this	paper	discusses	four	of	the	most	important	global	trends	as	they	were	accommodated,	adjusted,	and	transformed	on	both	sides	of	the	Taiwan	Strait:		the	removal	of	religion	from	politics	(secularization),	the	attempt	to	confine	it	to	a	purely	religious	sphere	(religionization),	the	increased	interest	in	textual	authority	and	religious	self-consciousness	(rationalization),	and	an	increase	in	the	direct	physical	manifestations	of	belief	through	unmediated	physical	experience	(embodiment).	All	four	processes	are	visible	in	both	the	regions	this	paper	discusses	–	Taiwan	and	southern	Jiangsu	–	in	spite	of	very	different	political	systems	and	religious	climates	since	the	Japanese	took	political	control	of	Taiwan	in	1895.		The	current	similarities,	I	will	argue,	show	the	relative	importance	of	shared	cultural	traditions	and	shared	global	influences	over	differing	forms	of	political	control.		Nevertheless,	some	significant	differences	have	also	appeared	in	the	religious	ecology	of	the	two	places,	especially	in	the	relative	importance	of	local	temple	worship,	Buddhism,	and	Christianity.		The	concluding	section	will	suggest	some	possible	explanations	and	explore	some	of	the	implications	for	civil	life.	
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China's	regions	vary	enormously	in	religious,	social,	and	economic	life.	For	that	reason,	it	makes	sense	to	compare	Taiwan	just	to	southern	Jiangsu	because	they	resemble	each	other	much	more	in	size,	population,	income,	and	educational	levels	than	they	resemble	many	other	parts	of	China.		While	hardly	a	perfect	laboratory,	such	a	regional	comparison	highlights	the	political	differences	that	have	characterized	Taiwan	and	mainland	China	for	almost	the	entire	period	since	Taiwan	was	ceded	to	Japan	in	1895,	while	roughly	controlling	for	other	variables.1	
Secularization	and	Religionization	The	term	"secularization"	covers	a	wide	and	sometimes	contradictory	set	of	usages,	only	some	of	which	will	be	discussed	here.		The	"secularization	theory"	of	the	1960s	and	1970s	generally	used	the	concept	to	mean	the	weakening	and	perhaps	eventual	loss	of	all	forms	of	religion	with	modernity.2		While	this	continues	to	be	one	of	the	most	common-sense	uses	of	the	term,	it	has	not	stood	up	well	empirically.		There	seems	to	be	little	or	no	decline	in	religiosity	in	North	America,	and	an	apparent	increase	in	many	other	parts	of	the	world	with	new	conversions	especially	to	Islam	and	Christianity,	and	an	intensification	of	religious	belief	across	almost	the	entire	world	religious	spectrum	(Berger	1999).		For	these	reasons,	this	article	will	not	use	secularization	to	mean	a	loss	of	religion.																																																									1	Research	in	Taiwan	draws	especially	on	work	in	the	town	of	Lukang	in	2006	(funded	by	the	Chiang	Ching-kuo	Foundation),	and	in	Nanjing	and	other	cities	of	southern	Jiangsu	in	2013-2014	(funded	with	Fulbright	and	Guggenheim	grants).		I	am	grateful	to	the	funders	for	making	the	research	possible,	and	to	scholars	at	Nanjing	University,	East	China	Normal	University,	Beijing	Normal	University,	UCLA,	and	Gordon	College,	where	I	delivered	versions	of	this	material	and	received	very	helpful	feedback.	2	For	an	overview	and	early	critique,	see	Martin	(1979).	
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It	focuses	instead	on	what	Jose	Casanova	calls	the	central	thesis	of	secularization:		"the	process	of	functional	differentiation	and	emancipation	of	the	secular	spheres	–	primarily	the	state,	the	economy,	and	science	–	from	the	religious	sphere	and	the	concomitant	differentiation	and	specialization	of	religion	within	its	own	newly	found	religious	sphere"	(Casanova	1994,	19).		That	is,	religion	that	had	been	deeply	embedded	in	the	social,	economic,	and	political	lives	of	people	is	separated	out	so	that	we	now	have	a	newly	defined	religious	world	that	has	been	pulled	out	of	everyday	life.	In	Asia	this	occurred	most	clearly	as	a	state-led	project	beginning	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	especially	as	new	modern	constitutions	were	being	adapted	from	Western	precursors.		There	was	not	simply	one	Western	model	of	how	to	secularize	in	this	sense.		France,	for	instance,	instituted	a	radical	separation	of	church	and	state	in	the	early	twentieth	century.		Turkey	and	Mexico	adopted	comparable	policies,	and	the	Guomindang	in	China	took	a	similar	approach	after	the	1911	Revolution.		On	the	other	hand,	several	northern	European	countries	maintained	a	closer	relationship,	as	in	Holland's	"pillar	system,"	where	tax	money	supported	religions,	which	were	given	important	welfare	responsibilities.		This	recognition	of	one	or	more	official	churches	fit	more	closely	with	Japan's	approach	in	the	twentieth	century,	and	thus	helped	shape	developments	in	Taiwan.	Several	studies	have	documented	this	process	on	the	mainland	during	the	Republican	period	(Goossaert	and	Palmer	2011;	Nedostup	2010).		An	example	from	the	Taiwanese	town	of	Lukang	(鹿港)	shows	the	same	process	as	it	happened	under	colonial	rule.		During	the	late	Qing	Dynasty	and	the	early	decades	of	the	Japanese	
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colonial	government,	most	social	organizations	of	every	kind	in	Taiwan	were	legally	organized	as	god-worshipping	societies	(神明会)	(Sangren	1984).		In	1923	the	state	conducted	a	census	of	all	of	these	groups.		In	a	town	with	a	population	of	about	20,000,	they	counted	66	god-worshipping	societies.		These	included	trade	groups,	businesses	like	the	coffin-makers,	and	social	organizations	like	neighborhood	associations	and	kinship	groups.		Each	of	these	groups	centered	on	a	ritual	altar	at	which	they	worshipped	their	patron	gods.		They	called	their	leaders	incense-pot	masters	(爐主),	the	same	title	held	by	leaders	of	popular	temples.		Almost	all	of	these	groups	also	conducted	many	other	kinds	of	activities,	from	settling	trade	disputes	to	helping	disaster	victims.		Religion	was	thus	intimately	tied	to	other	aspects	of	life,	and	not	yet	functionally	separated	from	economy	and	society	more	broadly.	Immediately	after	that	census,	however,	the	colonial	government	announced	that	it	would	no	longer	recognize	god-worshipping	associations	as	legal	forms	of	social	organization	(Xu	2000,	211–242).		As	a	government	project,	at	least,	religion	was	to	occupy	the	sphere	of	the	spiritual	alone,	and	not	leak	over	into	business,	politics,	and	social	services.		The	disembedding	of	religion	from	social	life	had	begun	through	a	separation	of	the	secular	and	the	religious.3	Sorting	religion	out	from	the	realms	of	society,	economics,	and	especially	politics	creates	a	secular	world,	but	the	same	process	also	creates	"religion"	itself.		When	religious	activity	is	truly	embedded	in	all	aspects	of	life	–	as	with	the	god-
																																																								3	A	later	attempt	to	create	Shinto	parishes	throughout	the	island	never	proceeded	far	because	of	the	war.	
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worshipping	societies	–	there	is	no	need	even	for	the	concept	of	religion.		In	places	like	India	or	China,	where	much	religion	remained	embedded	in	daily	life,	there	was	thus	no	obvious	translation	for	the	English	term	"religion."		Hinduism	in	India	was	constructed	to	fit	the	category	of	religion	only	under	British	colonial	rule	(Frykenberg	1993).	In	China,	the	modern	term	for	religion	(宗教)	was	coined	only	in	the	twentieth	century,	as	one	of	many	terms	borrowed	from	Japanese	translations	of	Western	philosophical	concepts.		The	two	characters	of	the	term	existed	separately,	but	each	had	meanings	that	were	both	religious	and	secular	(literally	a	lineage	of	teachings).		This	new	term	determined	a	concept	that	was	strongly	influenced	by	Protestant	conceptions	of	religion.		"Religion"	as	all	the	relevant	states	(Republican,	Communist,	and	Japanese	colonial)	defined	it	is	based	around	a	set	of	beliefs	(rather	than	ritual	practices),	which	are	set	out	in	sacred	texts,	guided	by	trained	clergy,	and	chosen	voluntarily	by	the	believers.		Thus	the	concept	of	a	separate	sphere	of	religion,	understood	in	basically	Protestant	terms,	developed	in	tandem	with	the	project	of	secularization.	Such	a	definition	was	not	completely	inappropriate	to	the	practice	of	Buddhism	and	Daoism	in	China,	although	the	idea	of	a	congregation	of	believers	did	not	fit	very	well.		It	did	not	work	at	all,	however,	for	Confucianism,	leading	to	anachronistic	arguments	about	whether	Confucianism	should	count	as	a	religion;	such	arguments	continue	even	today.		And	it	does	not	at	all	fit	the	popular	practice	of	burning	incense	in	local	temples	and	home	altars.		Unlike	India,	where	the	equivalent	ritualized	local	practices	became	religionized	as	"Hinduism,"	in	China	
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local	worship	traditions	were	denied	the	status	of	religion	and	were	instead	branded	with	another	neologism:		superstition	(迷信).4		All	of	the	relevant	twentieth-century	governments	had	clearly	unfriendly	policies	toward	Chinese	indigenous	worship	traditions.		At	the	same	time,	they	tried	to	fit	Buddhism	and	Daoism	into	the	new	mold	of	"religion."	It	is	thus	no	coincidence	that	three	important	changes	occurred	roughly	at	the	same	time	in	the	early	twentieth	century.		First	were	the	attempts	to	secularize	–	to	remove	the	religious	aspects	from	economic,	social	and	political	life.		Second	was	the	creation	of	the	category	of	"religion."		Third	was	the	development	of	large	institutionalized	religious	organizations	intended	to	unify	diverse	religious	traditions	into	structures	with	which	the	state	could	easily	interact	and	which	could	distance	themselves	from	more	embedded	and	traditional	practices	–	"religionization."		These	eventually	developed	into	China's	five	(or	Taiwan's	ten)	officially	recognized	religions.		It	is	important	to	remember	that	these	changes	were	primarily	government-led	projects.		As	such,	they	had	enormous	influence,	but	also	did	not	fully	succeed.		As	the	examples	discussed	below	will	show,	some	aspects	of	religiosity	continue	to	be	embedded	in	everyday	life	(or	have	become	re-embedded)	and	various	forms	of	religion	have	more	or	less	avoided	the	official	structures	of	control.		Nevertheless,	these	projects	have	transformed	the	religious	ecology	as	a	whole.	
																																																								4	See	Goossaert	and	Palmer	(2011)	for	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	this	process.	
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Rationalization	and	Embodiment	Max	Weber	focused	sociological	attention	on	processes	of	rationalization,	in	which	people	push	to	make	their	ideas	and	actions	consistent,	integrated,	systematic,	and	efficient.		In	his	work	on	religion,	he	argued	that	many	world	religions	had	developed	strongly	rationalized	tendencies,	but	that	Protestantism	took	that	process	in	a	new	direction	–	away	from	the	extra-worldly	rationalization	of	the	monastery	and	into	a	this-worldly	process	of	making	everyone's	actions	consistent	with	rationalized	beliefs	(Weber	2010;	Swidler	1973).	Whatever	the	merits	of	Weber's	specific	historical	argument	about	how	this-worldly	rationalization	related	to	capitalism,	by	the	twentieth	century	many	religions	had	moved	in	a	similar	direction.		We	see	this	in	Islam,	for	instance,	in	what	some	scholars	call	a	process	of	Islamization	that	has	swept	the	world.		They	are	not	referring	to	Islamic	conversion,	but	to	the	process	through	which	people	who	had	always	thought	of	themselves	as	Muslims	have	begun	to	think	self-consciously	about	what	it	means	to	be	a	Muslim.		This	worldwide	movement	has	led	to	significant	changes	in	practice.		Among	Jews,	it	is	evident	in	a	change	from	generations	of	traditional	practice	to	the	adoption	of	much	more	text-based	practice	in	the	twentieth	century	(Soloveitchik	1994).		Most	“fundamentalisms”	–	Christian,	Jewish,	Hindu,	Muslim	–	are	part	of	such	movements,	and	I	agree	with	those	scholars	who	thus	see	them	as	distinctly	modern	movements	(Eisenstadt	2000).	This	move	toward	rationalization	relates	closely	to	the	processes	of	secularization/religionization	that	I	just	discussed.		It	contributes	to	the	extraction	of	religious	belief	from	the	general	experience	of	daily	life,	to	the	change	from	a	
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taken-for-granted	religiosity/life	to	a	self-conscious	and	reflective	"religion."		Religion	becomes	something	most	clearly	represented	by	its	texts,	rather	than	by	the	repetition	of	contextual	practice.	A	prototypical	pattern	of	learning	to	deal	with	Chinese	gods	in	a	non-rationalized	way	is	the	common	sight	of	a	mother	kneeling	behind	her	little	son	and	teaching	him	to	worship	by	moving	his	hands	up	and	down	in	an	appropriate	gesture.		There	are	no	texts	for	this;	there	is	rarely	even	speech.		Chinese	temple	worship	in	general	has	little	rationalization.		Most	people	have	no	explicit	and	self-conscious	explanations,	and	have	little	interest	in	them.	At	the	other	extreme	are	highly	rationalized	activities,	like	most	of	what	occurs	in	the	modern	seminaries	of	all	China's	religious	traditions,	or	in	public	lectures	given	by	clergy.		In	contemporary	China	the	physical,	contextual	practice	of	burning	incense	or	paper	money	(for	instance	for	the	dead	at	the	Chinese	New	Year)	may	not	even	count	as	religion	any	more	even	though	it	is	widespread.		Instead	the	rationalized	practice	of	the	seminary	has	become	the	prototypical	definition	of	religion.	As	the	contemporary	example	of	a	child	learning	to	burn	incense	implies,	however,	rationalization	is	not	the	only	process	at	work.		At	the	same	time	as	there	has	been	an	increase	in	rationalized	religion,	there	has	also	been	an	increase	in	embodied	religion,	including	spirit	possession,	speaking	in	tongues,	and	healing,	as	well	as	the	continuation	of	contextualized	practice	like	burning	incense.		The	idea	of	embodiment	thus	includes	phenomena	seen	to	come	into	the	body	from	outside	(like	spirit	possession),	or	to	be	cultivated	from	the	inside	(like	reciting	the	
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Buddha's	name	or	Daoist	circulation	of	qi),	or	simply	to	be	performed	in	a	certain	way	because	that	is	the	tradition	(like	burning	incense).		In	a	sense	all	ritual	fits	into	this	last	type	of	embodiment	because	it	involves	primarily	the	performance	of	highly	established	and	predictable	actions,	words,	and	movements.		Sometimes	people	also	have	rationalized	explanations	for	rituals,	but	not	always.		And	with	or	without	explanation,	the	performance	of	the	ritual	itself	is	completely	embodied.	Embodied	religion	forges	an	experiential	bridge	over	the	sacred/secular	divide	while	generally	avoiding	rationalizing	issues	of	theology	and	philosophy.		The	causes	of	the	growth	in	embodied	religiosity	are	complex,	but	we	can	easily	see	the	results	over	the	twentieth	century.		They	appear	most	obviously	in	the	rapid	and	global	expansion	of	Pentecostal	practice	among	both	existing	Christians	and	new	converts,	which	began	at	a	revival	meeting	in	Los	Angeles	in	1906	(Martin	2008).		It	is	not	just	a	Christian	phenomenon,	however,	but	can	also	be	seen	in	the	popularity	of	Santeria	practice	in	North	America	or	of	witchcraft	in	Africa	(Martin	2008;	Geschiere	1997).		Embodiment	reclaims	the	close	ties	between	religion	and	the	rest	of	social	life,	without	addressing	the	theological	categories	that	are	part	of	the	dynamic	between	state	secularization	and	religious	self-consciousness.		Its	survival	and	even	increase	in	the	twentieth	century	show	the	limits	of	the	secularization	project.		Embodiment	is	not	necessarily	a	rejection	of	rationalization,	but	it	does	provide	an	alternate	and	very	different	form	of	religiosity	–	one	that	is	just	as	much	part	of	the	modernities	of	the	twentieth	century	and	beyond	as	religious	rationalization.		As	we	shall	see,	some	groups	in	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	have	moved	strongly	along	the	path	of	
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rationalization,	while	others	are	almost	completely	embodied.		Many,	however,	have	pursued	both	directions	at	once	and	there	is	no	fundamental	contradiction	between	rationalization	and	embodiment.	
Rationalization	and	Religionization	in	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	Let	me	begin	with	some	examples	of	the	combination	of	rationalization	and	religionization	in	Taiwan	and	Jiangsu	over	the	past	few	decades,	and	turn	below	to	cases	of	embodiment.	Perhaps	the	most	obvious	recent	example	is	the	growth	of	various	new	centers	of	humanistic	(人间)	Buddhism	in	Taiwan.		The	most	important	cases	have	been	Tzu	Chi	(慈济),	Buddha	Light	Mountain	(佛光山),	and	Dharma	Drum	Mountain	(法鼓山),	although	other	groups	have	also	contributed.		All	these	groups	trace	an	intellectual	lineage	back	to	Taixu	and	other	reformist	monks	of	the	1930s,	although	they	did	not	really	become	prominent	until	the	1980s	in	Taiwan,	and	somewhat	later	as	global	movements.	They	differ	significantly	from	each	other,	but	all	share	an	interest	in	a	more	rationalized	form	of	Buddhism.		Shengyan's	appeal	through	Dharma	Drum	Mountain,	for	example,	has	particularly	attracted	intellectuals	for	the	self-conscious	way	it	puts	Buddhism	in	conversation	with	modern	life.		Tzu	Chi	from	the	beginning	was	explicit	in	its	rejection	of	the	more	embodied	forms	of	traditional	Buddhism.		One	of	their	earliest	principles	was	that	they	would	not	earn	money	by	performing	rituals	for	people,	but	instead	support	themselves	through	handicraft	production.		All	donated	money	would	be	used	instead	for	charity.		Not	all	ritual	has	disappeared	–	they	still	perform	standard	Buddhist	morning	and	evening	liturgies,	for	instance.		
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Nevertheless,	much	of	their	time	is	devoted	instead	to	rationalizing	and	self-conscious	discourse,	including	both	preaching	by	Zhengyan	and	a	constant	stream	of	testimonials	by	followers.	Embodiment	is	not	irrelevant	to	this	group,	although	it	takes	a	very	different	form	from	more	traditional	Buddhist	embodied	practice	like	repeating	the	Buddha's	name	or	reciting	sutras.		Instead,	followers	are	expected	to	become	personally	involved	in	charity	–	organizing	clinics,	delivering	food	aid,	ministering	to	the	sick,	and	so	on.		Even	this,	however,	is	typically	converted	into	rationalized	experience	because	followers	constantly	narrate	the	significance	of	their	experience	(Huang	2009).	Jiangsu	does	not	yet	have	any	Buddhist	leaders	who	can	compare	to	the	global	influence	of	the	Taiwanese	groups.		Nevertheless,	there	is	a	wide	range	of	Buddhist	activity	of	all	kinds,	including	both	embodied	and	rationalized	forms	of	religion.		Tzu	Chi	itself	now	has	several	branches	in	Jiangsu,	including	its	mainland	headquarters	in	Suzhou.		Many	local	Buddhist	leaders	are	currently	also	increasingly	active	in	developing	their	own	discursive	approaches	to	Buddhism,	which	can	be	seen	especially	clearly	in	the	regular	postings	that	many	of	them	make	on	Chinese	social	media	like	Weibo	and	Weixin.		Nanjing's	Jiming	Si,	for	example,	posts	daily	messages,	many	of	which	instruct	followers	on	how	to	incorporate	Buddhism	into	their	daily	lives.		In	April	2014,	to	choose	an	arbitrary	example,	posts	included	topics	like	"Why	Does	Buddhism	Teach	That	'Life	is	Bitterness?'"	and	"What	Is	the	Difference	Between	Self-Cultivation	and	Cultivation	for	the	Public	
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Good?"		Others	comment	on	the	history	of	the	temple,	or	explain	particular	sutras,	or	suggest	vegetarian	recipes.	Many	lay	Buddhists	are	also	attracted	specifically	to	this	more	rationalized	side	of	Buddhism	(Jones	2010;	Fisher	2014),	and	it	is	quite	common	to	hear	followers	discuss	how	Buddhism	is	the	one	religion	with	no	superstition,	or	how	closely	it	relates	to	science.		Several	important	monasteries	have	also	opened	Buddhist	seminaries	(primarily	for	the	training	of	clergy);	in	the	Chinese	context	these	specialize	above	all	in	rationalized	approaches	to	the	religion.	This	is	not	just	a	Buddhist	phenomenon.		Most	"mainstream"	forms	of	Protestantism	in	both	Taiwan	and	Jiangsu	(and	the	United	States)	also	downplay	ritual	and	charisma	in	favor	of	the	explication	of	texts	and	the	narration	of	personal	experience	in	religious	terms	–	rationalization	within	the	religionized	niche	that	China	makes	available.		The	European	origins	of	Protestantism	were	strongly	anti-ritual	in	intention,	destroying	sacred	works	of	art	and	reducing	Catholic	ritual	life	to	almost	nothing	(Seligman	et	al.	2008).		Taiwan's	Presbyterian	Church,	which	is	by	far	the	largest	Christian	denomination	there,	is	very	much	in	this	rationalized	tradition.	So	too	is	the	Three	Self	Patriotic	Movement	–	the	officially	sanctioned	Protestant	church	in	mainland	China.		Their	services	feature	simple	hymns	with	clear	pedagogical	content,	non-charismatic	prayers	led	by	the	clergy,	and	long	periods	of	preaching	on	the	meaning	of	Biblical	texts.		This	is	consistent	with	what	Cao	Nanlai	曹南来	reports	from	Wenzhou	"boss	Christians,"	who	also	strongly	promote	the	idea	of	Christianity	as	the	most	rational	of	belief	systems	(Cao	2011).		
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The	embodied	side	of	religion	has	been	reduced	to	a	minimum,	and	the	experience	for	churchgoers	resembles	sitting	in	class	more	than	the	charismatic	participation	of	some	other	kinds	of	congregations.		Nevertheless,	churchgoers	I	have	seen	clearly	seem	to	enjoy	to	experience.	The	general	success	of	this	kind	of	rationalizing	and	pedagogical	Christianity	has	led	some	Buddhist	clergy	to	emulate	aspects	of	this	mode	of	religion,	even	in	more	traditional	forms	of	Buddhism.		For	instance,	some	temples	now	offer	Sunday	study	groups	for	followers	who	have	undertaken	a	Buddhist	refuge	(皈依)	ceremony	to	become	formal	followers	of	Buddhism;	in	others	a	monk	will	offer	lectures	to	such	people	on	the	first	and	fifteenth	of	each	lunar	month.		Many	of	these	activities	are	directly	rationalizing	in	the	sense	of	encouraging	followers	to	think	self-consciously	about	what	it	means	to	be	a	Buddhist,	and	to	find	ways	to	live	all	aspects	of	their	lives	in	a	Buddhist	way.	Various	forms	of	redemptive	societies	also	pioneered	new	forms	of	religion	in	Taiwan	and	mainland	China	beginning	in	the	early	twentieth	century,	often	reflecting	both	global	trends	toward	rationalization	and	embodiment	(Duara	2004;	Goossaert	and	Palmer	2011;	Jordan	and	Overmyer	1986).		These	groups	were	influenced	both	by	older	sectarian	traditions	in	China	and	by	new	religious	developments	in	Japan	at	the	time.		Many	of	these	sects	featured	both	religious	embodiment	–	especially	through	the	practice	of	spirit	writing	–	and	a	great	interest	in	explicitly	spelling	out	religious	principles	and	moral	worlds.			The	best	known	and	most	successful	of	these	groups	today	is	probably	the	Way	of	Unity	(一貫道),	a	salvationist	and	syncretic	sect	that	first	thrived	in	
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Republican-era	China	(Lu	2008).		It	eventually	became	illegal	under	both	Communist	and	Republican	governments	because	of	its	secret	activities	and	suspected	collaboration	with	the	Japanese	occupation	(Jordan	and	Overmyer	1986,	216–218).		Nevertheless,	it	blossomed	in	Taiwan,	where	it	was	finally	legalized	in	1987.		It	has	spread	out	among	Chinese	communities	globally	from	there.		The	group	claims	about	two	million	followers,	although	this	number	is	surely	generous.	Like	some	similar	groups	in	China	and	Taiwan,	the	Way	of	Unity	expects	its	members	to	give	a	thorough	moral	accounting	of	their	lives.		These	groups	typically	require	the	active	management	of	moral	capital,	with	an	emphasis	on	self-discipline,	work,	and	the	good	management	of	property	and	relationships.5		While	the	Way	of	Unity	stresses	its	retention	of	conservative	Confucian	values,	it	places	them	always	in	the	context	of	practical	concerns,	especially	health	and	wealth.		Its	meetings	stress	lectures	on	morality	and	behavior,	generally	rooted	in	classical	texts.		In	this,	it	resembles	the	return	to	text	that	has	been	occurring	among	many	Christian,	Muslim,	Jewish,	and	Buddhist	believers	in	recent	decades.		In	many	ways	these	meetings	look	and	feel	very	much	like	Bible	study	classes	popular	among	many	Christians,	or	like	some	of	the	more	recent	Buddhist	innovations	in	China.	Redemptive	societies	developed	in	a	kind	of	dialogue	with	the	state	secularization/religionization	project.		As	semi-underground	organizations,	they	often	spread	into	areas	that	were	no	longer	as	open	to	more	public	kinds	of	religious	groups.		Under	the	Japanese,	for	example,	they	were	strong	promoters	of	cures	for	opium	addiction.		That	is,	they	took	on	some	of	the	philanthropic	functions	that																																																									5	For	an	earlier	historical	example	of	such	a	group,	see	Berling	(1985,	208–218).	
	 15	
other	forms	of	religion	did	less	after	they	were	disembedded	from	much	of	social	life.		In	addition,	as	Goossaert	and	Palmer	describe	(for	the	mainland),	many	of	them	conceived	of	themselves	directly	as	parts	of	the	national/secular	project	(Goossaert	and	Palmer	2011,	108).		They	imagined	themselves,	in	brief,	as	religions	of	modernity	that	maintained	their	Chinese	roots	–	self-conscious	Chinese	answers	to	the	self-consciousness	of	mainstream	Christianity.	
Embodiment	and	the	Secular/Religious	Split	The	physical	acts	of	worship	–	burning	incense,	offering	food,	and	so	forth	–	are	the	most	widespread	examples	of	embodied	religion	throughout	the	Chinese	world.		Many	people	in	both	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan,	for	instance,	make	offerings	of	food,	incense,	and	paper	money	at	the	graves	of	their	ancestors	during	the	Qingming	
清明 festival.		The	fact	that	people	in	Taiwan	usually	think	of	this	as	religion,	while	people	in	Jiangsu	usually	deny	that	it	is	religion,	stems	from	different	ways	the	category	of	"religion"	was	sculpted	in	the	two	places	during	the	twentieth	century.		Some	people	in	both	places	believe	that	they	are	honoring	real	spirits,	and	others	simply	that	they	are	memorializing	the	dead.		The	key	issue,	however,	is	not	what	people	believe	or	whether	they	believe.		The	physical	performance	of	the	ritual	act	is	instead	the	crucial	thing.		It	is	not	unusual	when	interviewing	informants	in	China	or	Taiwan	about	why	they	perform	rituals	in	a	certain	way	–	why	stick	a	knife	in	the	back	of	the	neck	of	a	sacrificial	pig?	–	to	receive	a	response	like	"because	we	are	Chinese"	or	"because	our	ancestors	did	it	this	way"	or	simply	"because	it	looks	better	like	that."		Such	responses	are	a	clear	sign	that	the	behavior	is	not	strongly	
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rationalized:		people	have	little	interest	in	theological	or	symbolic	explanations	of	their	actions.		The	key	thing	is	the	embodiment	of	ritual	performance.	Such	practice	occurs	on	an	especially	large	scale	during	temple	festivals	(庙
会),	often	held	on	the	birthday	of	the	local	god.		These	occasions	have	become	especially	large	and	elaborate	at	the	half-dozen	Mazu	temples	that	now	dominate	the	religious	landscape	in	Taiwan.		Even	on	ordinary	days	these	temples	host	a	constant	stream	of	visitors.		When	I	lived	across	from	the	important	Mazu	temple	in	Lukang	in	2006,		every	morning	brought	a	combination	of	locals	coming	to	pay	their	respects	or	ask	for	favors,	pilgrims	making	the	rounds	of	the	island's	most	important	temples,	and	gods	visiting	from	other	temples,	with	their	images	carried	in	sedan	chairs	and	accompanied	by	costumed	and	often	possessed	religious	performers.	In	the	days	surrounding	Mazu's	birthday,	these	numbers	will	grow	from	hundreds	or	thousands	a	day	to	tens	of	thousands	and	more.		The	streets	are	jam-packed	with	people	and	enormous	jostling	crowds	make	movement	almost	impossible	around	the	temple	or	around	the	goddess	herself	when	she	tours	her	territory.		The	atmosphere	is	extremely	"hot	and	noisy"	(热闹),	which	is	the	sign	of	a	successful	ritual	and	an	efficacious	temple.		The	smell	of	incense	and	the	acrid	odor	of	burning	paper	money	permeate	everywhere.		These	events	have	very	little	in	the	way	of	theology	or	other	self-conscious	religious	rationalization.		People	may	know	stories	of	miracles	the	goddess	has	performed,	but	not	much	else.		They	are	there	for	the	blessings	(often	vague	and	unspecified)	that	participation	brings,	and	for	the	entertainment	that	has	always	been	an	important	part	of	such	festivals.		This	is	
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embodiment,	and	probably	on	a	scale	not	seen	in	Chinese	societies	before	the	twentieth	century.		These	particular	Mazu	temples	certainly	did	not	act	on	such	a	large	scale	before	the	last	century.6	Such	traditions	also	exist	on	the	mainland,	of	course,	though	there	is	little	comparable	to	the	rise	of	the	Mazu	cult	in	Taiwan.		Rural	temples	in	southern	Jiangsu	now	tend	to	be	locked	most	days	of	the	month	(unlike	their	counterparts	in	Taiwan),	which	means	the	frequency	of	worship	is	less.		Nevertheless,	the	embodied	nature	of	the	activity	when	it	occurs	(usually	on	the	first	and	fifteenth	of	the	lunar	month)	is	very	similar.		Larger	festival	occasions	attract	big	crowds,	although	nothing	on	the	scale	of	the	Mazu	cult	in	Taiwan.	Taiwan's	very	lively	embodied	worship	has	also	directly	affected	southern	Jiangsu,	and	it	may	be	that	embodied	practice	will	increase	there	as	a	result	of	this	contact.		For	instance,	there	is	an	enormous	new	Mazu	temple	in	Kunshan,	built	very	much	in	the	style	of	Taiwanese	or	southern	Fujianese	temples	rather	than	Jiangsu.		Kunshan	is	a	major	center	for	Taiwanese	business	people.		The	temple	is	built	very	much	with	the	blessing	of	the	local	government,	including	the	Religious	Affairs	Bureau.		For	them	it	is	part	of	an	economic	strategy	to	keep	the	Taiwanese	community	investing,	but	the	temple	itself	also	attracts	embodied	worship	from	local	people.		I	burnt	incense	there	in	2014	together	with	a	high	Kunshan	official	who	appeared	to	be	quite	devout	through	the	process	of	working	with	Taiwan	businessmen.		Like	temple	festivals,	this	example	shows	how	embodied	religiosity																																																									6	Elana	Chipman	traces	the	change	to	the	way	one	of	these	temples	(the	Ta-chia	大甲Mazu)	was	able	to	take	advantage	of	the	new	transportation	system	built	under	the	Japanese	(Chipman	2009).	
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can	often	refuse	the	discipline	of	the	secular/religious	split,	instead	implicated	religion,	social	ties,	and	politics	all	at	once.	Nanjing	has	two	Mazu	temples.		Unlike	the	Kunshan	temple,	these	both	have	long	histories,	one	having	started	as	the	Fujian	business	association	(会馆)	and	the	other	having	been	founded	by	the	Ming	Dynasty	eunuch	Zheng	He	to	thank	Mazu	for	her	help	after	one	of	his	naval	voyages.		Both	have	been	reconstructed	recently	with	strong	support	(including	donations)	from	the	state's	chief	religious	offices	–	the	Religious	Affairs	Bureau	and	United	Front	Work	Department	of	the	Communist	Party	–	again	primarily	with	Taiwan	relations	in	mind.		These	officials	allow	temples	and	worship	as	a	way	of	encouraging	connections	to	Taiwan	and	attracting	Taiwanese	investment,	but	the	process	itself	changes	the	religious	landscape,	encouraging	an	intensification	of	embodied	practice,	sometimes	even	among	the	officials	themselves.	I	will	not	attempt	to	cover	the	full	range	of	embodied	practice	here,	for	example	various	forms	of	cultivation	(修行),	but	it	seems	important	to	mention	the	classic	case	of	bodies	being	possessed	by	external	spirits.		Spirit	possession	has	a	very	long	history	in	Chinese	societies.		In	Taiwan,	however,	there	has	been	a	marked	increase	in	spectacular	public	performances,	often	involving	bloodshed	as	the	mediums	prove	the	genuineness	of	their	trances	by	striking	themselves	with	weapons	like	swords	or	balls	of	nails.		This	is	probably	the	result	of	the	increasing	professionalization	of	mediumship	there.		The	competition	among	groups	of	mediums	for	employment	drives	a	constant	escalation	in	the	shock	value	of	the	
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performance.		As	with	other	kinds	of	performance,	Taiwan's	economic	success	brought	an	increase	in	such	embodied	displays,	not	a	decline.	Spirit	mediumship	has	revived	in	Jiangsu	(and	elsewhere	in	China	since	the	Cultural	Revolution),	although	with	none	of	Taiwan's	bloody	and	public	spectacles.		Instead	they	focus	primarily	around	healing	(which	is	also	common	in	Taiwan).		One	network	in	the	suburbs	of	a	medium-sized	Jiangsu	city	has	expanded	from	one	very	influential	medium	to	a	group	that	includes	several	dozen	of	his	disciples,	most	of	whom	are	possessed	by	deities,	and	who	use	that	power	to	cure	patients	who	are	said	to	have	been	possessed	by	evil	spirits.	This	form	of	embodiment,	where	the	body	itself	is	the	direct	vehicle	for	the	spirit	world,	is	not	limited	to	popular	beliefs.		Charismatic	and	Pentecostal	Christians,	who	have	spread	so	rapidly	around	the	world,	also	welcome	the	Holy	Spirit	into	their	bodies	as	they	speak	in	tongues,	see	the	future,	and	heal	by	laying	on	hands.		Both	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	have	experienced	this	movement	in	various	forms.		One	example	in	both	places	is	the	True	Jesus	Church	(Lian	2010),	which	grew	out	of	an	indigenizing	Chinese	Christian	movement	in	the	early	twentieth	century.		Their	Nanjing	branch	was	re-founded	in	1993,	and	claims	to	have	baptized	close	to	2,000	people	since	then.		Their	main	church	in	Nanjing	is	usually	full	with	over	400	people	on	Saturdays	when	they	worship	all	morning.		The	most	remarkable	points	of	their	services	are	the	prayers,	during	which	everyone	drops	to	their	knees	and	begins	to	speak	in	tongues	(灵言),	each	making	sounds	that	vary	from	babbling	syllables	to	extended	trills.	
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This	kind	of	embodied	experience	is	almost	the	opposite	of	rationalized	religion.		The	rationalization	process	is	about	crafting	words,	composing	discursive	worlds	to	explain	religion.		Speaking	in	tongues,	however,	is	language	that	cannot	be	understood,	and	for	that	reason	it	is	the	only	true	language	–	the	only	language	in	which	it	is	impossible	to	lie,	and	which	must	thus	come	directly	as	a	gift	from	God.		The	True	Jesus	Church	does	not	reject	rationalization.		Their	preachers	explain	Biblical	passages,	for	example,	in	ways	very	similar	to	what	happens	in	non-charismatic	churches.		With	True	Jesus,	however,	the	embodied	side	of	religion	plays	a	crucial	role	that	it	does	not	in	many	other	forms	of	Christianity.	
General	Thoughts	Both	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	have	shared	in	and	contributed	to	global	religious	trends	that	have	been	taking	place	over	the	past	century.		Both	places	have	been	home	to	state	secularization	and	religionization	projects.		Both	have	been	part	of	the	trends	toward	rationalization	and	embodiment.		These	movements	have	taken	place	in	spite	of	the	powerful	political	differences	that	separated	Taiwan	and	mainland	China	over	the	same	period.	These	changes	crosscut	religion	as	well	as	political	regime,	including	Buddhism,	Protestantism,	and	temple	worship,	as	well	as	other	traditions	not	discussed	here.		Thus,	for	example,	we	have	the	growth	of	both	charismatic	Christianity	with	its	speaking	in	tongues	and	spiritual	healing,	and	of	more	mainstream	Protestantism	similar	to	what	Weber	had	discussed.		Buddhists	have	seen	an	increase	in	embodied	practices	like	reciting	the	Buddha's	name	while	circling	a	temple	or	meditating.		At	the	same	time	they	have	also	greatly	increased	
	 21	
rationalizing	practices	like	the	broadcast	of	commentaries	on	sutras	or	lectures	on	integrating	Buddhism	into	daily	life.	The	reasons	for	the	similarity	are	that	both	Taiwan	and	Jiangsu	have	been	exposed	to	the	same	powerful	global	religious	movements,	and	that	both	began	with	very	similar	cultural	repertoires	of	religion	and	local	practice.		Another	contributing	factor	is	probably	that	Chinese	religions	(certainly	including	Taiwan)	before	the	twentieth	century	had	relatively	low	levels	of	institutionalization.		Even	for	Buddhism	and	Daoism,	some	of	whose	clergy	were	enmeshed	in	monastic	hierarchies,	there	was	never	an	equivalent	to	the	authority	of	the	Pope	or	of	a	figure	like	the	Anglican	Archbishop	of	Canterbury.		Furthermore,	attempts	to	establish	an	official	church	in	China	had	been	largely	abandoned	after	the	Tang	Dynasty.		This	means	that	it	has	been	relatively	easy	for	religion	to	evolve	in	response	to	a	changing	local	and	global	environment.		There	is	little	structural	impediment	to	change	due	to	the	lack	of	strong	institutions	of	control.	The	results	of	this	are	especially	clear	for	temple	worship,	which	was	never	regulated	as	religion	by	either	the	Republican	or	Communist	governments.		Both	political	systems	were	unfriendly	toward	temple	worship,	although	Taiwan	never	took	as	extreme	steps	to	stop	it	as	happened	on	the	mainland.		Nevertheless,	such	practices	remain	robust	in	both	places	–	whether	or	not	they	are	given	the	name	of	"religion."		This	has	been	especially	obvious	in	the	great	increase	in	the	embodied	rituals	of	village	temples	in	Taiwan	since	the	island	grew	wealthy	beginning	in	1970s.		We	see	it	in	Jiangsu	as	well,	however,	for	example	in	the	spirit	mediums	discussed	above,	or	in	the	tens	of	thousands	of	people	who	fill	large	urban	Buddhist	
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temples	to	burn	incense	on	Chinese	New	Year's	Eve,	or	who	make	offerings	at	their	ancestors'	graves	during	the	Qingming	Festival.		They	may	not	conceive	of	this	as	"religion,"	but	it	grows	out	of	the	same	move	toward	embodied	practice	that	has	affected	rural	temple	religion.	Nevertheless,	Taiwan	and	Jiangsu	have	also	evolved	some	important	differences,	one	of	which	directly	involves	the	form	of	institutional	control.		Both	the	governments	of	Republican	China	and	the	People's	Republic	of	China	constructed	new	organizations	intended	to	unify	and	standardize	each	of	the	officially	recognized	religions	(although	the	list	differed	in	the	two	cases).		These	were	never	as	effective	in	Republican	China	(including	post-1945	Taiwan)	as	in	the	People's	Republic,	and	in	Taiwan	they	have	become	largely	inconsequential	since	the	democratization	process	began	formally	in	1987.		The	success	of	those	institutions	on	the	mainland	has	meant	that	there	has	so	far	been	less	creativity	among	mainland	Buddhists	than	in	Taiwan.		Large	institutions	tend	to	constrain	creativity,	and	Jiangsu	is	only	now	beginning	to	develop	more	innovative	Buddhist	alternatives,	something	perhaps	like	the	1960s	and	1970s	in	Taiwan,	when	the	seeds	that	grew	into	huge	globalized	Buddhist	movements	first	began	to	sprout.	This	brings	us	to	an	unexpected	finding	in	the	comparison	between	Taiwan	and	Jiangsu:		the	religious	landscape	in	Taiwan	appears	to	have	moved	these	global	trends	in	a	more	indigenous	direction	than	in	Jiangsu	or	anywhere	else	on	the	mainland.		This	can	be	seen	largely	in	three	phenomena:		differences	in	the	growth	of	Buddhism,	in	the	liveliness	of	popular	worship,	and	in	the	prominence	of	Christianity.		As	I	have	just	discussed,	Taiwan	has	witnessed	a	much	more	rapid	and	
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creative	growth	of	Buddhism,	and	this	is	the	result	in	part	of	the	different	institutional	structures	and	their	relations	to	the	state.		Buddhism	of	course	is	not	indigenous	in	the	strictest	sense	of	the	term,	but	nevertheless	succeeded	so	rapidly	in	Taiwan	partly	because	people	view	it	as	a	culturally	Chinese	rather	than	an	imported	way	of	living	in	the	modern	world.	The	situation	for	popular	worship	is	different;	it	has	no	large	regulatory	organizations	in	either	Taiwan	or	Jiangsu.		Nevertheless,	its	infrastructure	of	temples	and	images	was	destroyed	on	the	mainland	and	only	began	to	recover	on	a	large	scale	in	the	1980s.		Its	redevelopment	across	China	has	been	uneven.		Southern	Jiangsu	has	not	been	one	of	the	areas	where	it	has	grown	rapidly,	and	rapid	urbanization	and	urban	renewal	have	created	new	kinds	of	problems	for	community-based	temple	worship.		It	thus	appears	to	have	a	less	lively	popular	worship	life	than	Taiwan,	even	though	southern	Jiangsu	resembles	Taiwan	on	indicators	like	income	and	education	much	more	than	most	other	places	on	the	mainland.		Thus	here	again	Taiwan's	lively	popular	worship	sector	appears	to	have	allowed	a	blossoming	of	indigenous	religious	resources.		It	draws	on	(and	contributes	to)	the	same	global	trends	that	are	influencing	Jiangsu,	but	it	is	using	many	more	uniquely	Chinese	resources	in	doing	so.	This	brings	us	to	the	final	difference,	the	much	more	rapid	growth	of	Christianity	in	Jiangsu	(northern	Jiangsu	much	more	than	southern,	but	to	some	extent	everywhere	in	China)	than	in	Taiwan.		A	look	at	history	and	policy	might	lead	us	to	expect	exactly	the	opposite.		The	Guomindang	had	always	treated	Christianity	with	a	much	more	relaxed	attitude	than	any	other	religion;	the	Communists	in	
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contrast	greatly	increased	control	over	its	practice.		Large	numbers	of	foreign	missionaries	entered	Taiwan	after	1949,	but	they	largely	disappeared	from	the	mainland.		Nevertheless,	Taiwan	has	seen	only	very	slight	increases	in	the	percentage	of	Christians,	while	all	agree	that	the	number	has	gone	up	very	rapidly	in	Jiangsu	and	beyond.		That	is,	the	mainland	is	directly	taking	part	in	the	largest	global	trend	carrying	the	new	forms	of	embodied	and	rationalized	religion:		the	spread	of	Protestantism.		Taiwan,	however,	has	instead	been	adapting	those	forms	to	indigenous	religious	resources,	rather	than	following	the	move	to	Protestant	conversion.	The	reasons	are	complex,	but	include	the	greater	destruction	of	indigenous	religious	alternatives	on	the	mainland,	the	continuing	difficulties	that	popular	temples	face	because	they	are	not	recognized	as	religion,	and	the	tighter	institutional	control	over	religion,	which	Christians	have	ignored	enough	to	be	able	to	expand	underground.		Christians	in	Jiangsu	and	elsewhere	on	the	mainland	have	also	been	able	to	position	themselves	as	the	religion	most	compatible	with	modernity,	while	in	Taiwan	Buddhists	have	been	able	to	occupy	this	position.		All	of	this	can	still	change.		The	reconstruction	of	Mazu	temples	in	southern	Jiangsu	could	become	a	catalyst,	and	in	principle	so	could	rural	migration	to	cities.		Yet	we	also	need	to	recognize	that	the	religious	ecologies	of	the	two	places	are	already	different.		Religion	continues	to	evolve	rapidly	in	both	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan,	but	it	will	not	necessarily	change	in	the	same	direction.	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	the	social	ties	created	through	religion	during	Taiwan's	authoritarian	period	became	important	resources	for	the	consolidation	of	
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democracy	after	1987	(Weller	1999;	see	also	Madsen	2007).		Could	the	same	thing	happen	on	the	mainland?		Certainly	the	religious	situation	on	the	mainland	today	bears	some	resemblance	to	Taiwan	in	the	years	before	its	democratic	transition.		While	the	regulatory	system	remains	restrictive,	much	religious	life	on	the	ground	is	booming,	and	in	the	process	creating	social	worlds	that	owe	little	to	officially	sanctioned	state	structures.		These	are	exactly	the	kinds	of	resources	that	a	successful	transition	will	need.		On	the	other	hand,	as	I	have	argued	here,	the	religious	ecologies	of	the	two	places	are	now	different	in	important	ways	(as	the	broader	political	ecologies	too,	of	course)	and	I	would	thus	not	suggest	that	Taiwan's	religious	evolution	is	a	simple	path	that	the	People's	Republic	is	emulating	several	decades	later.	I	have	compared	Jiangsu	and	Taiwan	in	part	to	make	a	point	about	variation	within	Chinese	societies.		The	obviously	different	political	histories	of	Taiwan	and	mainland	China	over	the	past	century	in	some	ways	create	less	variation	than	we	might	imagine.		For	religion,	that	is	why	both	places	fit	fairly	well	with	the	broad	global	religious	trends	toward	state	secularization,	religionization,	rationalization	and	embodiment.		On	the	other	hand,	significant	religious	differences	characterize	all	the	regions	of	China.		Much	of	Fujian	looks	more	like	Taiwan	than	Jiangsu.		Henan	is	different	again.		Even	the	religious	ecologies	of	southern	and	northern	Jiangsu	are	quite	different	from	each	other.		In	the	end	we	have	to	attend	carefully	to	the	unique	histories	of	specific	places,	in	all	their	richness	and	complexities.		 	
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